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FROM : **USPOLAD, Heidelberg**

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DESP. NO.

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TO : **THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.**

August 25, 1959

DATE

REF

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	OTHER
	9/9	CIA OSD Comd

SUBJECT: **East German Position During and After Geneva**

The following information from a usually reliable and well-placed source has been made available to this office by G-2, USAREUR:

"The Geneva Conference.

"During both the first and second phase of the conference, the East German delegation did not receive one single directive from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and performed its work independent of ministerial control. This is attributed to the fact that Foreign Minister Dr. Lothar Bolz, Deputy Foreign Minister Otto Winser, and the other officials were in constant touch with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. In addition, the periods between conference sessions were too brief to allow enough time for obtaining direction from the Ministry in East Berlin.

"It is not believed in official East German circles that the Western Powers will ever agree to the establishment of an all-German Committee composed of equal numbers of representatives from both German states. This is partially due to the extreme West German opposition to this scheme. Further, the Western Powers realize, in the opinion of the East Germans, that the creation of such a committee would have a disastrous effect on internal West German politics. The Western Powers will eventually realize that the re-unification of Germany will never become a fact, no matter what the West might propose to that end. At this moment, the East Germans feel the re-unification of Germany is no longer a major factor in East German policy. Greater emphasis is now being placed upon the fight against West German militarism. Negotiations between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union are more likely to concern such topics as barring atomic weapons from the West German forces or the liquidation of militarism in West Germany. The price which the Soviets may be willing to pay for such concessions would, however, not be the unification of Germany, as proposed by the Western Powers. That price would, at best, be an agreement on the status quo including Western rights in Berlin.

"Future moves of the East German Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

"Prior to the conclusion of the Eisenhower-Khrushchev talks, the Ministry will not undertake any important steps in the field of foreign policy. In the consular field, however, several measures will be undertaken

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during the coming months:

"1. The Ministry will cease stamping East German transit visas in Federal Republic of Germany passports of West Berliners desirous of traveling to other 'Socialist' countries via East Germany. These visas will, in the future, be affixed to an inserted page of the West Berlin personal identity documents. This Ministry proposal has already been approved by the SED Central Committee Politburo.

"2. Foreign nationals traveling to West Berlin will no longer receive an East German transit visa for travel through East Germany to West Berlin. Since, in East German opinion, West Berlin is located in East German territory, foreign nationals wishing to travel to West Berlin will be issued East German 'entry visas for West Berlin.' This latter measure has not, repeat not, been decided upon by the Foreign Policy Commission of the SED Politburo. A position paper has however been prepared on this subject by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

"The Eisenhower-Khrushchev talks.

"United States agreement to these talks is a sign that the U.S. has adopted a more conciliatory policy toward the Soviet Union. The talks will probably be an exchange of ideas on various problems and will not result in any substantive decisions. The talks will, however, result in another four power conference. If the agenda of such a conference were to include Germany and Berlin, the Soviet Union would demand East and West German participation.

"Separate East German-Soviet peace treaty.

"The Soviets will not conclude any separate peace treaty with East Germany prior to the conclusion of the Eisenhower-Khrushchev talks and any subsequent conferences, since such action would aggravate the present situation. (East Germany's contemplated measures with regard to visas for West Berliners and foreign nationals traveling to West Berlin are not considered aggravating, since they do not affect the rights of the Western Powers in West Berlin.)

"It is the consensus of opinion in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the Soviets will not take any unilateral action in Berlin as long as negotiations are going on. This opinion is based on the Khrushchev press conference of 5 August, in which he made a statement to that effect. The Ministry further believes that, even in the event of a prolonged pause in negotiations, no change in the present Berlin status would occur.

"Complete silence prevails within the Ministry on the subject of a turn-over of control functions in Berlin to the East Germans. The original position papers prepared by the Ministry concerning this subject have been ~~sent~~ returned to the Ministry's Department for Legal Affairs and Treaties. The papers have been turned over to Deputy Minister Winzer

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for study and it is believed that he co-ordinated them with the Foreign Policy Commission of the SED Central Committee and with the Politburo. At present, no further work is being performed on these position papers.

Roland F. Moores
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